Abstract: This paper describes the Chinese economic and institutional reform process as a gradual transition of an informal, relation-based governance system into a more formal and rule-based governance system. The consequences of macro-level institutional reforms on the importance of personal relationships for the firm-level governance of business operations are discussed. Theoretical considerations suggest that in a transition economy such as China companies' incentives to reduce the reliance on personal relationships should depend on firm characteristics such as the age, size and the internationalization of the firm. We confront these suppositions with empirical data obtained from a company survey performed among 222 companies in the electronics industry operating in the Pearl River Delta, China. From this we obtain some, though often weak, evidence in favor of the suppositions.
Introduction
Over the last three decades, China has recorded very high economic growth rates and developed into the second largest economy in the world. This remarkable growth was accompanied and fueled by continuing reforms of formal legal and market institutions which together led to substantial changes in the institutional environment in which business firms operate in China. This reform process may be viewed as a gradual transformation of the Chinese economy from an informal, relation-based governance system to a more formal and rule-based governance system (LI 2004; LI/PARK/LI 2004) .
The importance and pervasive use of personal relationships in daily social and business life in China has attracted considerable attention among researchers from various disciplines. There has in particular been a growing economics and management literature on the role of personal relationships for doing business in China. Most of the empirical studies of that literature are based on surveys among Chinese managers or foreign managers with some experience in Chinese business (e.g. XIN/PEARCE 1996; DAVIES/LEUNG/LUK /WONG 1995; LUO 1997; PARK/LUO 2001) . Generally, the survey results confirm the importance of personal relationships with other managers and/or with government officials (for a summary see LAN-GENBERG 2007 , LUO 2007 . In a study related to the present one, BICKENBACH/LIU (2010) confirm this general observation for Hong Kong based companies with operations in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) 1 , China. They also find evidence showing that personal relationships are less important than other more objective criteria for these companies' decisions on business partners (and business locations). This result may be interpreted as an indication that the improvements in the formal institutional environment induce companies operating in current China to gradually reduce their predominant reliance on informal relation-based governance instruments and turn to make increased use of rule-based governance instruments such as formal contracting and public information institutions.
Theoretical considerations suggest that, in a transition economy such as China, not all companies will have equally strong incentives to Frank Bickenbach/ Wan-Hsin Liu, Kiel Firm characteristics and informal governance of business operations in the Pearl River Delta, China move from informal relation-based to more formal, rule-based forms of governance. The incentives to reduce the reliance on personal relations will be stronger, in particular, for older, larger and faster growing firms. The same may be expected to be true for companies with more international business contacts (international suppliers or customers) or larger foreign ownership interests. This paper outlines the theoretical considerations underlying these suppositions and confronts them with data obtained from a company survey that was done among 222 companies in the electronics industry operating in the PRD, China.
In the following we briefly present the institutional economics perspective on the nature of informal, relation-based and formal, rule-based modes of governance and their comparative (dis)advantages, both at the aggregate and at the firm level and derive our core suppositions regarding the relation between firm characteristics and firms' incentives to use of personal relationships for doing business in a "transition" economy. Then we outline the changing institutional environment in China in general and in the PRD in particular and we discuss the empirical results regarding the relation between firm characteristics and the role of personal relationships for doing business in the PRD.
Theoretical considerations
Institutions, i.e. rules and instruments to enforce these rules, matter for the efficiency of human exchange (NORTH 1990) . By defining and protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and providing reliable information, well functioning (economic) institutions can reduce the risks and transaction costs of investment and exchange. These institutions can be formal or informal. Formal institutions include political, judicial and economic rules, ranging from written constitutions and statutory laws to specific regulations and to individual contracts. Informal institutions include the social and religious norms, traditions and codes of conduct and the social networks that exist in a society (NORTH 1990, 36, 47) . Two levels of institutions are to be distinguished: the institutional environment and institutional arrangements. The institutional environment is the overarching framework of political, social and legal rules and constraints that define the context in which economic and social interaction takes place. Within this framework, parties to a specific exchange set up institutional arrangements, i.e., formal and informal (micro-level) rules and forms of contracts that govern the way in which they cooperate and/or compete (WILLIAMSON 1996, 378) .
Three elements of the institutional environment, in particular, are of great importance for the level and the organization of economic exchange of an economy: contracting institutions, property rights institutions and information institutions. Contracting institutions are the rules that support the conclusion and the enforcement of contracts between (private) economic agents (ACEMOGLU/JOHNSON 2005, 955) . They affect the costs of drafting and enforcing contracts and consequently the type of contracts and transactions realized. Property rights institutions are the rules that protect (the returns to) the assets held by economic agents against expropriation by others, in particular, by the government and politically powerful elites (ACEMOGLU/JOHNSON 2005, 955; GREIF 2005, 728) . They affect the risk of direct government expropriation as well as the level to which regulations and public decisions determine a level playing field for all economic actors or favor and protect a small elite with close relationships with the government. Information institutions are public or private institutions for gathering and distributing information. They affect the amount and the quality of information available to economic actors (and public agents) and impact, in particular, the cost of screening (potential) business partners and of monitoring their performance. 2 There are substantial differences between societies in the nature and sophistication of their basic institutions and in the degree to which they are able to reduce the transaction costs and the risks associated with economic exchange and investments in private assets. In Western societies, over time, a complex system of formal institutions for public information provision, contract enforcement and property rights protection has been devised, on which people can build for governing economic exchanges. Many of these formal institutions are non-existent, weak or poorly devised in less developed countries (BARDHAN 2005, 512) . To govern economic exchanges people in these countries tend to rely more on informal institu-tions and personal relations, e.g., guanxi in China (LI/PARK/LI 2004, 63).
Based on this general observation, we may distinguish for analytical purposes between two modes of governance systems: relationbased and rule-based governance systems (LI 2003; LI/PARK/LI 2004; DIXIT 2004) . The two systems differ both at the macro-level of the institutional environment and at the micro-level of the institutional arrangements chosen to govern individual transactions between economic agents. These differences have profound implications for the nature and size of transaction costs under the two governance systems.
In a rule-based governance system public rules (laws and regulations) and state policies are transparent, fair, and universally applied and economic transactions are largely based on impersonal and explicit formal contracts. Both, public rules and private contracts can be impartially enforced by the executive and the court system (LI 2003, 655; LI/PARK/LI 2004, 64) . Economic agents have access to highquality and verifiable business information provided through a broad range of well established public information institutions (e.g. accounting and auditing rules, credit information institutions). This reduces the costs of screening and monitoring (potential) business partners and of enforcing business contracts (LI 2003, 657) .
In a relation-based governance system, by contrast, public rules tend to be unfair and opaque, and the state is unable to enforce these rules impartially (LI / PARK / LI 2004, 64) . Courts, due to the lack of independence and/or competence, are generally not able to enforce public rules or private contracts effectively. Most transactions between business partners are governed by personal and implicit agreements that are enforced outside the courtrooms (LI 2003, 652) . Publicly available information about (potential) business partners is rare and generally of low-quality. Key information about business partners has to be derived from personal relations. Information about business partners and business relationships tends to remain personal, and relational, i.e., mutually observable to the two transaction partners but unverifiable by people outside the relationship (LI/PARK/LI 2004, 64, 69; LI 2004, 108). 3 It is widely recognized that the importance and the relative efficiency of formal institutions and rule-based governance increases relative to that of informal institution and relation-based governance as the scope of market exchange broadens and deepens (see NORTH 1990; LII 2003; DIXIT 2004; LI/PARK/LI 2004) . Relationbased governance systems work well in small or/and well-knit groups, whereas efficient exchange relations in large groups require more formal institutions for information dissemination and enforcement. At the aggregate level relation-based governance is associated with comparatively low fixed costs as it avoids the high fixed costs of developing elaborate formal public information and contracting institutions. At the level of individual exchanges, parties with existing personal relationships will find relation-based governance to be less costly as it saves the costs of legal enforcement and information verification. However, relation-based governance exhibits comparatively high and increasing costs of extending business to new business partners. Extending business will increasingly require establishing relations with persons, to which agents have a priori only weak or no private relations which raises the costs of searching for competent and reliable partners and of establishing personal relations with them.
A rule-based governance system, in contrast, involves large fixed costs for establishing the necessary legal and informational infrastructure. However, once the necessary information and contracting institutions have been established the marginal costs of screening potential business partners and of negotiating and enforcing an (additional) contract between an (additional) pair of transaction parties, including strangers, are comparatively low due to the quality of publicly available information and the fact that the contracts are explicit, impersonal, and standardized (LI 2003, 657; LI/PARK/LI 2004, 65) . As the scale and scope of the economy increases, the fixed costs of establishing a rule-based governance system can be spread over a larger number of transactions, thus lowering the average costs. Eventually an expanding economy will reach a point where the average transaction costs are smaller under rule-based governance than under relationbased governance and it would be advantageous for society to develop an institutional environment that supports rule-based governance. Heft 1-2 / 2012
The transition of an economy from a (more) relation-based to a (more) rule-based governance system will generally be a gradual and slow process. The basic informal institutions that exist in a society are often embedded in cultural traditions and moral value systems. They therefore possess inertia that slows the pace of institutional change (ZENGER/LAZZARINI/POPPO 2002, 283 f.). 4 Even the effects of occasional broad and fast changes of formal institutions may be limited by tensions between the new formal rules and existing informal rules that respond only gradually to changes in the formal institutions. These tensions may undermine compliance with formal rules and may create a lag between the implementation of a new formal institutional structure and its overall functionality (ZENGER/LAZZARINI/ POPPO 2002, 283 f.; NORTH 1990, 91) . Simply issuing new, Western-type, business laws and formal institutions may thus not be sufficient to substantially improve the quality of public information, of legal contract enforcement and of the effective protection of property rights. And even if the new formal institutions work reasonably well, persistent cultural norms may still induce (some) economic agents at the micro-level to stick to the use of relation-based forms of governance. This is true, in particular, where the cost advantage of rule-based governance is still relatively small (and competitive pressures are not too strong).
The theoretical considerations about the working and the (relative) costs and benefits of the two modes of governance suggest, that firms' incentives to move from relation-based to rulebased governance should depend on a number of firm characteristics, such as the size and the growth performance of the firm, its age, its ownership and the degree of its integration into national and international markets. The marginal cost of relation-based governance will generally be higher for large firms than for small firms. At the same time it will be easier for them to bear the firm-level fixed costs of rule-based governance -such as the costs of introducing new accounting and auditing systems or of acquiring the skills necessary to formulate and manage externally enforceable contracts. We should therefore expect that large firms have a greater propensity to engage in rule-based governance than small firms. Similarly, as the development of personal relations to new business partners is costly and timeconsuming, firms that are growing quickly in size and in the number of business partners will have greater incentives to reduce their reliance on personal relationships. Firms that are able and willing to make use of formal, rule-based mechanisms for searching and screening new business partners and managing and enforcing contractual agreements will find it easier to quickly expand the number of their business partners and will thus be able to grow faster.
The age of a firm is certainly correlated with its size and possibly with its growth rate. The age of a firm will therefore have an indirect effect on its incentives to use rule-based governance mechanisms. The age of a firm can be expected to also have a direct influence on these incentives, however. Old-established firms will have accumulated substantial experience with relation-based governance and will already have established long-term personal relationships with a number of business partners and possibly public officials as well. Even as institutions of rule-based governance get gradually established at the level of the institutional environment, these firms will have an interest to continue to make use of their existing relationships, though it may become increasingly difficult to sustain these relationships as switching business partners becomes easier during the transition. At the same time established firms may have built up a public reputation as reliable business partners which allows them to get into business with new partners more easily. By contrast, even with improving information institutions new firms will generally have great difficulties signalling reliability and competence. At least with respect to getting into contact with new business partners existing personal relations with family members or friends (or early business partners) can thus be expected to be more important for young firms than for old-established ones. As to the importance of personal relations for doing business in general there is no clear conjecture about the role of firm age, however. On the one hand it will be very difficult for young firms to establish themselves in the market without personal relations, on the other hand older firms will simply have more well-established personal relations to business partners or public officials on that they can continue to build.
For heads of firms from a relation-based economy it is generally much more difficult to establish and cultivate personal relations with foreign business partners that are not acquaint-ed with the specifics of relation-based governance than with business partners from their own region or country. Domestic firms will therefore be less likely to use relation-based governance mechanisms for business transactions with foreigners than for transactions with domestic business partners. As firms with many foreign business partners will get acquainted with using formal information and contracting institutions and will have to invest in their ability to use these institutions, they will also be more likely to reduce their reliance on relation-based governance even for transactions with domestic business partners. In a transition economy, relation-based governance will therefore be comparatively less important for firms that have more business relations with customers or suppliers from Western economies. Similar arguments apply to the comparison of domestically-owned and foreign-owned firms. Foreign owners and managers will generally not be familiar with the specifics of relation-based governance and it will be much harder for them to establish personal relationships with executives of local firms. At the same time, they are familiar with rule-based governance instruments. They will therefore have an incentive to extend formal governance mechanisms to their local subsidiaries and their transactions with local partners as well. In transition economies, foreignowned (in particular Western-owned) firms can thus be expected to make less use of personal relationships than domestically owned firms.
Changing institutional environment for doing business
China today may be viewed as a society that is in a gradual process of transition from a relation-based to a more rule-based governance system (LI 2004; LI/PARK/LI 2004).
The (traditional) role of personal relationships in China
The importance and pervasive use of personal relationships in daily social and business life in China has been stressed by numerous observers and has attracted considerable attention among researchers from various disciplines (for a partial overview with a focus on business economics and sociological economics see LANGENBERG 2007) . While the cultivation of personal relationships, in some form and to some extent, exists in every society, its specific form, guanxi, and its pervasiveness and importance in daily social and business life are often considered distinctively Chinese (STAN- DIFIRD/MARSHALL 2000, 22) . Guanxi is cultivated through the repeated exchange of gifts and favors, which creates a sense of reciprocal obligation and indebtedness of the partners (STANDIFIRD/MARSHALL 2000, 22 f.). Developing bilateral guanxi to several other persons that may also develop personal relationships among each other leads to a guanxi network. As information about a partner's opportunistic behavior with one of his exchange partners spreads through the whole network, such behavior can easily result in the offending party being banished from the network altogether. Within guanxi networks, the threat of network expulsion increases the cost of opportunistic behavior, thus providing an increased assurance that one's exchange partner will not act opportunistically. The flow of information within guanxi networks is not restricted to information on members' conduct for the purpose of sanctioning opportunistic behavior, however. There is also a vivid exchange of information about business opportunities and about the competence and reliability of potential business partners. "The exchange of information favors in guanxi networks is so common that guanxi is said to act as an 'information bridge'" (LANGENBERG 2007, 46) . These benefits do not come for free, however. Establishing and cultivating guanxi networks takes time and other resources. Moreover, having to choose, due to reciprocal obligations, transaction partners from within one's personal network may inhibit potentially profitable transactions with people outside the network (LAN-GENBERG 2007).
The importance of guanxi in China is not restricted to relations between private persons. Given the paramount role that the state (government and bureaucracy) continues to play in the Chinese society and economy, personal relationships with government and party officials (political relations) are considered to be of great significance for citizens' quality of life and businesses' success (see, e.g., LANGENBERG 2007). 5
Reform of the formal institutional environment in China
Since the beginning of economic reforms in 1978 there have been dramatic changes in the institutional environment for doing business in China. By 2007, the year of the company survey underlying our empirical analysis, formal contracting, information, and with some reservations also, property rights institutions have been improved considerably. The first Economic Contract Law passed in 1981 was still intended largely to regularize relations between state-owned enterprises. As economic reforms gradually led to a great expansion in the number and importance of non-state enterprises the role of contract law shifted towards governing the interactions between independent economic agents. The overall scope of contract laws was gradually broadened by passing specific contract laws and amending the Economic Contract Law. In 1999, the different contract laws were replaced by a new unified contract law that gave broad range to freedom of contract and provided a uniform legal framework for economic contracts by individuals and enterprises alike, regardless of ownership and nationality (for details see CLARKE/MURRELL/WHITING 2008). During the reform, the importance of courts for the resolution of disputes over contracts increased substantially. Despite their many remaining deficiencies courts are now playing a significant role in dispute resolution (CLARKE/ MUR-RELL/WHITING 2008), and in comparison with other developing and developed countries, the ability of Chinese courts to solve disputes over simple and clearly written contracts has been rated quite favorably (in 2007). 6 Like contract law, many of the public information institutions that are of great importance in modern market economies were virtually nonexistent when the reform process began. By 2007, China has made substantial progress in reforming or introducing some of these information institutions -though much remains to be done. An important example are accounting standards. In the early stages of the reform process, several different sets of accounting rules applying to firms with different ownership structures and from different industries were introduced. Generally, these rules deviated substantially from international accounting standards. (see JENTZSCH 2008) . In 2006, it contained information on about eleven million enterprises of which about five million had a credit relationship. Later the system was extended to include credit information on individuals. 7 As these examples illustrate, access to business information has expanded substantially during the reform period. Several important reform steps have been taken only rather recently, however, and there is still a long way to go before public information institutions in China reach Western standards.
Compared to the progress made in improving formal contracting and information institutions, reform progress in formal property rights institutions has been (even) more limited. Only in 2007, after several years of considerable controversy and delay, a unified Property Law was passed. This law introduces and defines the concept of property rights in a unified way covering state property, collective property as well as private property. It defines the rights owners have over their property and the obligations assumed by others in respect of this property. However, to ensure that the law was passed, a number of areas, including modalities of legal redress, have been left vague, limiting the effectiveness of the protection of private property rights in practice (OECD 2008, 23 More generally, due to broad decision making powers of numerous (local and central) government bodies and courts' inability to effectively constrain (arbitrary) government action China's current legal system is largely unable to provide secure property rights. A main reason for courts' inability to effectively enforce laws and constrain governments is their political and financial dependence on local governments. 8 This makes it difficult for courts to decide against the wishes of local governments, and allows local governments to influence courts, or to ignore their decisions, in order to accommodate the interests of companies with strong political relationships (CLARKE/MUR-RELL/WHITING 2008; for examples see LI 2004).
In current China, local and central government officials still hold numerous instruments and wide discretionary powers to interfere with business operations and affect business success. Business operations require licenses, permits and approvals from various governmental authorities and are subject to numerous business laws and regulations. The requirements for obtaining licenses and permits as well as the terms and interpretations of business regulations often lack transparency. They can differ substantially across provinces, districts and even towns and are subject to frequent changes. Business success is also affected by officials' decisions on the allocation of landuse rights and of other scarce resources, or by their decisions on subsidies, favorable tax treatments and government procurement contracts. Against this background personal relations with public officials can help smooth business operations and reduce the risk of expropriation by the politically powerful.
Changing institutional business environment in the PRD
As a consequence of the substantial influence that local and regional politicians have on business relevant policies and on the enforcement of laws and contracts, the quality of the legal system and of formal market institutions can differ considerably across Chinese provinces. Our empirical analysis is restricted to firms located in the Pearl River Delta in the province of Guangdong. Therefore, the quality of the institutional environment of Guangdong is of particular interest to our analysis. Guangdong has been a pioneer region of the Chinese economic reforms over the last three decades. Since the beginning of reforms the business and investment environment in Guangdong has been more developed and more business friendly than in many other Chinese provinces. This has recently been confirmed by a World Bank report (World Bank 2008) that compared the business and investment environments of 30 major cities in China (from all Chinese provinces, with the exception of Tibet). Four indicators of a business-friendly environment were compared: the ease of starting a business, of registering property, of getting credit, and of enforcing contracts. Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong, ranked among the top three cities for all four indicators and it even ranked first for contract enforcement. Legal and formal market institutions are thus generally more developed in Guangdong (and in the PRD in particular), than in most other Chinese provinces. Still, as compared to advanced Western countries (or to neighboring Hong Kong) formal legal and market institutions in Guangdong are still clearly deficient and certainly much less favorable to a rule-based governance of individual business operations.
It is worth mentioning that the comparatively advanced institutional reform process in Guangdong has gone hand in hand with an expansion and internationalization of (private) economic activity that is outstanding even for Chinese standards. Guangdong had the highest GDP (2,621 bio. RMB) of all Chinese provinces and the growth rate (15 %) was also among the highest in China in 2006 (NBSC 2007 . In the same year, the number of state-owned and non-state-owned industrial enterprises with annual revenues of over 5 mio. RMB was about 37,500, the second largest number of all Chinese provinces, and these companies' gross industrial output and industrial value added were higher than the corresponding figures in all other provinces. Having the second highest openness index 9 , Guangdong's economy was also more strongly integrated into the international markets than all other Chinese provinces, with the exception of Shanghai.
For an institutional and economic environment such as that of Guangdong, or the PRD, the institutional approach suggests that personal relations with business partners and with public officials are still playing an important role for many firms' business operations. However, with continuously improved formal institutions and with increasing scale and complexity in business operations on site, certain firms may already begin to reduce their dependence on personal relations and to increasingly rely on formal institutions for governing their business operations.
Empirical analysis
The PRD Company Survey 2007 on which our empirical analysis is based was addressed to executives of electronics companies in the PRD. 10 As the economically dominant region within Guangdong province with its comparatively advanced institutional reform process and its vivid private enterprise sector, the PRD constitutes a suitable research region for our research purpose. The focus on a single indus-try helps to reduce industry-level firm heterogeneity and allows our analysis to focus on those firm characteristics that are, according to the theoretical considerations, likely to affect firms' decisions on the use of relation-based or rule-based governance instruments. The electronics industry was selected due to its substantial importance for the regional economy in the PRD. The gross output of the electronics industry's enterprises (state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises with annual business revenues of at least 5 mio. RMB) amounted to 41 % of all industries in 2006 (GPBS 2007) . Moreover, the electronics industry is a very dynamic industry characterized by short product life-cycles, quick product-related process modifications, and large research and development expenditures (TUAN/NG, 1995) . In combination with the high intensity of global competition within the industry, these features force companies to continuously optimize the governance of their business operations.
For our survey a total of 400 electronics companies were randomly selected from the comprehensive company catalogue Guangdong Electronics 2007. Overall 222 of these companies completed and returned the questionnaire. Our empirical analysis is based on the responses to a subset of the questions of these questionnaires. In the following we first present our results on the general role of personal relationships for doing business in the PRD. We then turn to the results on the importance of personal relationships (relative to other more formal and impersonal alternatives) for three critical business functions, namely for getting into contact with customers and with suppliers and for obtaining short-term finance. Finally, we present evidence on how the importance of personal relationships for individual firms varies with firm characteristics such as age, ownership structure, size and growth performance.
Role of personal relationships for doing business in general
Within the questionnaire two questions relate to the general importance of personal relationships for companies' business operations in the PRD, with the first one considering personal relationships in general and the second one focusing on political relations. As to the importance of personal relationships in general, executives were asked to use a five-level Likert scale to assess the importance of six specified reasons for their firms' decisions to fulfill some business tasks in the PRD via personal networks: to "substitute for missing laws and regulations" (SubMLaw), to "respond quickly to customer demands" (ResCus), to "increase company's operational flexibility" (IncFlex), to "reduce risks and uncertainties" (RedRisk), to get "access to business-related information" (AccInfo), and to "solve business disputes" (SolDis). In total, about two thirds of respondents consider responding quickly to customer demands as a very important or important reason for their company to fulfill some tasks via personal relationships, whereas only about a quarter of them do so for substituting missing laws/regulations, or for solving business disputes (Tab.1). The shares of respondents considering the other three reasons as very important or important are at intermediate levels. 11 Of the 212 executives who answered this question, 170 executives (about 80 %) considered at least one reason as very important or important for their company to fulfill some tasks in PRD The two most important reasons for using personal relations, improving the ability to quickly respond to customer needs and increasing companies' operational flexibility -the executives' assessments of the importance of these two reasons are highly correlated across firms (Spearman correlation coefficient of almost 0.6) -, are essentially performance objectives and relation-based governance instruments may be advantageous for achieving these objectives even if formal institutions were well developed. And the one reason that explicitly refers to weak formal institutions, namely using personal relations as a "substitute for missing laws and regulations" has been considered important or very important by a minority (25 %) of respondents only. This seems to suggest that most companies in PRD do not see the deficiencies in the institutional environment but general transactions costs advantages of relation-based governance as the main reason for their use of personal relations. 12 Given the fact that public officials in China still have ample opportunities to directly or indirectly interfere with business operations and affect business success, companies may not only consider personal relationships with private economic agents important for doing business in the PRD but also personal relationships with public officials (political relations). Executives were therefore asked to assess the importance of political relations for carrying out five business "activities" 13 : "getting permissions for production/investment" (GetPermProd), "getting export/import concessions or licenses" (GetExImCon), getting "access to buildings and/or land" (AccBuild), getting "access to materials and resources" (AccRes), getting "access to financial support from government" (AccGovSup). Of the 212 companies that have answered the question, 144 companies (about 68 %) considered political relations very important or important for at least one of the "activities" considered (Tab. 2). While more than half (54 %) of all respondents considered personal relationships with public officials very important or important for companies in PRD to get permissions for production and investment, only about 27 % and 31 % of them considered political relations important or very important for getting access to materials and resources and to financial support from government, respectively. The shares for the other two alternatives take intermediate values.
These results suggest that political relationships are still important for companies to get access to 'production factors' that are crucial for companies' operations and are still under the control of government.
An analysis of the pair-wise correlations between the assessments of the alternatives from the preceding two questions reveals that those executives that considered political relations more important (than other executives) also tended to consider "missing laws and regulations" as a more important reason for using personal relations in general. This may be taken as an indication that firms tend to consider the importance of political relations a consequence of weak formal institutions.
The role of personal relationships for critical business functions
Getting into contact with customers: It has been argued that in relation-based economies (100) personal relations are playing an important role in selecting business partners, while other impersonal alternatives of searching for and screening (potential) business partners are becoming more important as formal information and contracting institutions are getting more effective. In order to investigate the relative importance of relation-based governance mechanisms for companies to find new customers, we asked the executives to assess the importance of four different channels for getting into contact with their customers. (We also asked them to indicate if their companies did no use the respective channel at all.) Two of the four channels are non-relation-based, namely "bidding competitions", and "active searching (e.g., exhibitions, internet, sales agents)", while the other two are relationbased, using "business contacts (e.g., recommendation from business partners)" or "private contacts (e.g., recommendation from family members and friends)".
The results (Tab. 3) paint a mixed picture of the (relative) importance of personal relations for getting into contact with customers. While one formal channel "bidding competition" was the least frequently used channel among the companies in the PRD, the other formal channel "active searching" was the most frequently used one with only 10 % of companies not using this channel at all. The share of executives assessing "active searching" as very important or important (65 %) is also the highest one among the four channels considered. Interestingly, an almost equal share of executives (61 %) considered "business contacts", very important or important. In contrast, only about a third of respondents assigned the same importance levels to the other two channels, private contacts and bidding competition, respectively. 14 Overall, these results suggest that for a majority of firms in the PRD personal relations, in particular existing business contacts, still play an important role for searching for and screening new customers. However, despite remaining deficiencies in the formal institutional environment, most firms do not exclusively rely on relation-based channels to get into contact with customers but make important use of more formal, impersonal instruments for searching new customers as well.
Part of an explanation for the substantial importance of impersonal (formal) instruments for getting into contact with new customers may be the importance of foreign customers (exports) for many electronics companies in the PRD. Personal relations may be expected to be of much less importance for these customers. On average, firms in our sample sold roughly half of their products (in value terms) to customers in mainland China and slightly less than a quarter of products to "advanced countries" (North America, Western Europe, Australasia and Japan). We expect that the two relation-based contacting channels tend to be more important for companies with higher shares of product sales in the mainland China.
To test this supposition, we calculated the pairwise Spearman correlations between the executives' assessment of the importance of the two relation-based channels of contacting customers on the one hand and their firms' shares of sales in mainland China on the other hand. The results confirm our supposition. With respect to the share of sales in mainland China, (100) 220 (100) 220 (100) both correlation coefficients are negativethough only the one for private contacts is statistically significant -suggesting that the higher the share of sales realized in mainland China, the more important the two relation-based channels for contacting customers.
Getting into contact with suppliers: Similar arguments also apply to companies' search for potent and reliable suppliers. Therefore the questionnaire also contained a question on the importance of different channels for getting into contact with suppliers. The same four channels as in the case of customers were considered and the same five-level Likert scale was applied. The responses are generally quite similar to those obtained for the case of customers (Tab. 4). 15 "Bidding competition" turns out to be the least frequently used channel, while "active searching" is the most frequently used one.
As to the importance of the four channels considered, the responses suggest that "active searching" is the most important channel for getting into contact with suppliers (with about 70 % of respondents considering this channel as very important or important), followed by "business contacts" (about 56 %). "Private contacts" and "bidding competition" are considered the least important channels.
As for the case of customers, we expect the two relation-based channels of getting into contact with suppliers to be more important for companies sourcing a greater share of inputs from Chinese suppliers. On average, companies source about 73 % of their inputs from mainland Chinese but only 8 % from the "advanced countries". To test this supposition, we calculated the pair-wise Spearman correlations.
Contrary to our supposition, none of the correlation was found to be statistically significant. One possible explanation for this is that there is too little variation between firms with respect to the locations of their suppliers (73 % from mainland China). Differences between firms in the importance of the two relation-based channels for getting into contact with suppliers thus have to be attributed to differences in other firm characteristics.
Financing: For relation-based economies in transition such as current China (or PRD) we expect personal relations to also play an important role for companies' efforts to secure adequate finance and, in particular, for their ability to obtain short-term finance. In order to investigate this issue, executives were asked to assess the accessibility of six different sources for meeting their firms' short-term financial needs: "Chinese banks", "HK banks", "foreign banks", "affiliated companies/business partners", "customers", and "family members and friends". The last three sourcing alternatives may be considered relation-based. A five-level Likert scale was applied, with "1" indicating "very easily accessible" and "5" "not accessible". According to the executives' responses (Tab. 5), only about 26 % of companies never obtained short-term finance from a Chinese bank, while 44.8 % and 45 % never obtained short-term finance from "family members and friends" and from "affiliated companies", respectively. About 37 % never did so from "customers". Generally, to obtain short-term finance is not an easy task for most companies. After all, only about 29% considered it easy or very easy to obtain short-term finance from a Chinese bank. For the other (potential) sources (100) 218 (100) 217 (100) this number is even lower. To obtain short-term finance from family and friends was easy or very easy for only about 17 % of the companies. The corresponding numbers for customers and affiliated companies are 22 % and 12 % respectively. 16 The result that many PRD companies face substantial difficulties when trying to obtain shortterm finance from Chinese or even foreign banks should not be surprising, given the deficiencies in, e.g., accounting and credit information institutions. It is not generally true, however that it is easier for firms in the PRD, and therefore more widespread, to obtain shortterm finance by using personal relationships (either with family members, affiliated companies or customers) to. In particular, only slightly more than half of all firms ever obtained short-term finance from family members or friends and only about one out of six of these firms considered it (very) easy to obtain finance from this source. In the following section we will see, however, that there are significant differences between different "types" of firms with respect to their assessment of relation-based finance.
Firm characteristics and personal relationships for doing business
We expect that different "types" of firms may differ systematically in their use of relationbased versus rule-based instruments for governing their business operations. More specifically, larger firms or faster growing firms and foreign-owned firms in China should tend to make less use of relation-based governance than smaller, stagnant and Chinese-owned firms. We also expect younger, less established, firms to rely more on personal relations than older firms for getting into contact with new customers or suppliers or obtaining shortterm finance. This should be true in particular for private relationships with family members and friends. We therefore look into the empirical relation between the executives' assessment of the importance of personal relationships (as reflected by their answers to the questions discussed above) on the one hand and their firms' age, ownership structure, size, and growth performance on the other hand.
Firm characteristics and personal relationships for doing business in general:
In order to investigate the role of firm characteristics for the importance of personal relations, we first analyze the pair-wise correlations between firm characteristics and executives' responses to the questions on the general role of personal relationships for doing business in the PRD and on the importance of political relations, respectively (cf. Tab. 1, 2). The firm characteristics considered are defined as follows: (1) company age (Age) is equal to the difference between the survey year (2007) and the founding year of a company (plus 1); (2) ownership (ForeignOwn) is an ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 3 and referring to Chinese-owned enterprise, Chinese-foreign cooperative joint venture, Chinese-foreign equity joint venture and wholly foreign-owned enterprise, respectively; (3) a first size variable (Employ) is equal to the average number of total employees during the year before the survey; (4) (100) 211 (100) 211 (100) 211 (100) 211 (100) 210 (100) [1, 5), [5, 10) , [10, 50) , [50, 100) , and [100, ∞); (5) growth performance is measured by an ordinal variable (GrowSales) with four classes (0 to 3) for the average annual growth rates since 2002, where classes are defined as (-∞, 0%), [0%, 2%), [2%, 10%), [10%, ∞) (see also the appendix).
The Spearman correlations between firm characteristics and the importance of the six reasons for using personal relations are reported in Tab. 6. For the age variable five of the six correlations are positive, though only two of them ("responding quickly to customer demands" and "reducing risks and uncertainties") are statistically significant. 17 Still, the predominantly positive correlations could be considered as (weak) support for the view that personal relations are generally more important for younger firms, e.g. because it is relatively more difficult and costly for them to use formal institutions and public reputation mechanisms to govern their business relations.
As to the ownership structure, correlation results give strong support for our hypothesis that greater foreign participation in company ownership is associated with a lower general importance of personal relationships for that company. This effect may (partially) be attributed to the fact that foreign owners will generally be more (less) acquainted with rule-based governance (relation-based governance). Legal and cultural norms of the foreign owners' home country may aggravate reservations against the use of informal, relational institutions.
Correlation results for the size variables, particularly those for the employment variable, give support to our supposition that personal relations tend to be less important for larger firms. All correlations with respect to "Employ" are positive and four out of six are statistically significantly so. Correlations with respect to the other variable used to proxy firm size, "Sales", are also uniformly positive, though only one of them is significant. As to firm growth there is no supportive evidence for our supposition of a positive relation between a company's growth performance and the general relevance of personal relationships, however. Almost all relevant correlations are negative (though generally quite small), suggesting that a better growth performance of firms is, if anything, associated with a greater importance of (the various reasons for using) personal relationships. A possible explanation is that fast growing firms may have to mobilize all their resources, including their personal networks, and use all available formal and informal governance instruments to support their expansion.
Turning next to the importance of political relations for doing business in the PRD, there seem to be (almost) no associations of this with the different firm characteristics (see Tab. 7) . Given the severe deficiencies of the institutional environment in China with respect to the protection of private property rights against expropriation by government and the ample opportunities that public officials have to interfere with firms' business operations and success, political relations seem to be of similar importance for all types of companies. and new suppliers as well as for obtaining short-term finance. We expect each of the firm characteristics -firm age, firm size, growth performance and foreign ownership -to be negatively related to the importance of relation-based governance instruments. (Note that contrary to the case of the general role of personal relationships for doing business we do expect a negative effect of age on the importance of personal relations here. Due to our importance scale, "1" being very important, this implies that we are expecting positive correlation coefficients). In order to test these suppositions, we calculated pair-wise Spearman correlations between the different firm characteristics and the importance of relation-based governance for getting into contact with customers and with suppliers and for obtaining short-term finance.
The results (Tab. 8) suggest that firm age, in particular, is playing an important role for firms' decisions to use relation-based governance in the business context considered here. Most age-related correlations are significantly positive, suggesting that younger firms tend to consider relation-based channels more important (more easily accessible) than older firms for getting into contact with their customers and suppliers (for obtaining short-term finance). Moreover, the correlations between firm age and the importance of private contacts to get into contact with customers and suppliers are (slightly) larger than the correlations with respect to business contacts. This suggests that as firms get older the importance of private (e.g., family) relations tends to decline faster than that of relations to business partners in general. This may reflect the simple fact that younger firms, can build on a limited network of business contacts but a relatively larger pool of private contacts, whereas the business network tends to increase as firms get older. This effect seems to be even substantially stronger for firm size.
For both measures of firm size the correlations with the importance of private relations for making contacts with both customers and suppliers are positive and statistically highly significant, while correlations with the importance of business contacts are insignificant. This suggests that larger firms tend to rely more on personal contacts but no less on business contacts for screening new customers and suppliers than smaller firms. When firms are small, existing private contacts may be sufficient for supporting their business operations. However, as firms grow and their operations become more numerous and manifold, existing private contacts may become an insufficient basis for expanding the business. Contrary to our expectations, there seems to be no systematic effect of firm size on the importance or accessibility of relation-based sources of shortterm finance. In addition, as above (and possibly also for the same reasons) we do not find any support of our supposition of a negative association between firms' growth performance and the importance of personal relations.
As to foreign ownership, there is, again contrary to our expectations, no statistically significant effect of the ownership structure on the importance of private or business relations for contacting new customers and suppliers. At least the sign of the correlations suggests, however, that private contacts but not business contacts might be slightly less important for firms with foreign ownership participation. This may be interpreted as an indication of a substitutive relation between private and business contacts. The limited number of private contacts on site may induce foreign-owned firms to more strongly rely on existing business contacts for extending their business to new customers and suppliers. With respect to financing, the effect of the ownership pattern is more clear-cut and consistent with our supposition. All three relation-based sources are less important for shortterm financing for firms with stronger foreign ownership interests and the coefficients regarding "customers" and "family and friends" are statistically significant or even highly significant.
In summary, for most firms personal relationships with business partners and with political officials seem to be of substantial importance for doing business in the PRD in general. For several critical business activities -getting into contact with new customers and suppliers and accessing short-term finance -relationbased mechanisms and sources are not generally more important than more formal or impersonal ones, however. Finally, there is some, though generally rather weak, evidence that firm characteristics, such as company age, size and foreign ownership are, as expected, negatively associated with firms' reliance on personal relationships for at least some of the business functions considered. In contrast, no systematic (negative) relation was found in general between firms' growth performance and the importance of personal relationships. Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the numbers of corresponding observations. Coding as in Table 3 , Table 4 , and Table 5 , respectively; with "not used = 6". For further explanations see appendix. ***/**/* refer to the 1%/5%/10% significance level in one-tailed significance tests. Source: own survey
Conclusions
China today may be viewed as a society that is in a gradual process of transition from an informal and relation-based to a more formal and rule-based governance system. At the macro-level of the institutional environment there have been, over the last decades, remarkable improvements of the formal contracting, information and (with some reservations) property rights institutions. This is true, in particular, for the province of Guangdong, which has been a pioneer region of economic and institutional reform in China, and for the PRD, Guangdong's core economic region. Even there, however, the quality of many formal legal and market institutions is still far from what it is in most advanced economies.
In light of the gradual character of the reform process and the remaining deficiencies in the institutional environment, theoretical considerations suggest that informal institutions and personal relations with private business partners and with political officials can be expected to be still of considerable importance for the firm-level governance of business operations in the PRD, in general. Given the continuing improvements of formal institutions at the macro-level and an increasing scale and scope of firms' business operations, firms' marginal costs of developing personal relations will increase and their benefits will decrease. As a consequence, firms operating in China will tend to gradually reduce their reliance on informal relation-based governance and make increased use of rule-based governance instruments, such as formal contracting and public information institutions, instead. Not all firms will have equally strong incentives to move from relation-based to more formal governance mechanism, however. Rather, we expect the incentives to reduce the reliance on personal relations to be stronger, in particular, for older, larger and faster growing firms as well as for firms with more international business contacts (international suppliers or customers) or with larger foreign ownership interests.
These suppositions were confronted with firmlevel data obtained from a survey of 222 companies of the electronics industry operating in the PRD. Though most of the empirical results seem to be broadly in line with the theoretically founded suppositions, the empirical evidence is generally rather weak. This weakness may be partially attributed to a small sample size and the limited number of relevant variables we could construct from the available database. The paper should thus be taken only as a first, exploratory attempt to obtain (empirical) evidence on the relation between firm characteristics and the firm-level importance of relation-based governance during China's institutional reform process. Future research may build and improve upon the current study by employing a larger and richer database on an issue that is of considerable importance to the future economic development of China and other transition economies.
Notes
1 The Pearl River Delta (PRD) comprises nine municipalities of the Chinese Province of Guangdong: Dongguan, Foshan, Guangzhou, Huizhou, Jiangmen, Shenzhen, Zhaoqing, Zhongshan, and Zhuhai. 2 Institutions that improve the availability and quality of information on economic agents' past conduct and their ability to perform include accounting and auditing rules, credit rating and credit reporting institutions and land and liens registries. As these institutions also impact the cost of designing, managing and enforcing contractual agreements there are important interdependencies between information institutions and contracting institutions. 3 In relation-based governance systems agreements are, therefore, mostly enforced by second-party enforcement mechanisms: each party to an ongoing relationship is deterred from behaving opportunistically and from breaching the (implicit) agreement by the other parties' threat to retaliate and/or to terminate the relationship. Sometimes agreements and information about business partners' performance will be made partially explicit and verifiable to third-parties to allow for third-party enforcement, which may take one of two forms. In relation-based third party enforcement, the deterrent to breach an agreement is strengthened by the threat that the miscreant will be barred from future business not only with the particular partner on which he acted opportunistically but with a whole group of (potential) business partners. This threat may be further buttressed by social ostracism if the group fosters social ties among its business members (DIXIT 2004, 27 f.) . The second form is third party enforcement by the state, which will not generally be impartial in relation-based systems, however. Frequently, in case of conflict, the contracting parties' personal relations with politicians or state officials will determine the enforcement outcome or the ex-post bargaining power of the parties (LI 2003, 657) . 4 The basic formal institutions of a society generally also tend to be quite persistent and their change mostly incremental. Occasionally, however, windows of opportunity arise, in which formal institutions can change very fast and in large discrete steps (NORTH 1990, 89 ff.) . 5 Political relations can be a 'lubricant' for a wide variety of private or business-related activities: e.g., obtaining driver's licenses, getting access to medical treatment or to universities, gaining favorable verdicts in lawsuits, obtaining the permits required for all kind of business operations, getting access to scarce resources. 6 In terms of the ease or difficulty of enforcing a simple commercial contract, China ranked 20th of 178 economies in the World Bank's report "Doing Business 2008 " (World Bank 2007 . Criteria used to determine the ranking are the time, the cost and the number of procedures involved from the moment a plaintiff files the lawsuit until actual payment in a specific, well defined commercial dispute. 7 The scope, accessibility and quality of credit information available through either public or private credit registries and their coverage are central criteria in the World Bank's ease of 'getting credit'-index. For this index, China ranked 84th of 178 economies in 2007 (World Bank 2007). 8 The power to appoint and to dismiss courts' leadership rests with government or party organizations at
